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SHIRLEY MOYES, on behalf of
H, JACK MOYES, deceased,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 19236

STATE OF UTAH, STATE INSURANCE
FUND, SECOND INJURY FUND and
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,
Respondents.

PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
NATURE OF CASE
This is a review of a final Order of the Industrial
Commission of Utah denying petitioner, H. Jack Moyes, workmen's
compensation benefits.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER ADMINISTRATIVE BODY
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirmed the
Adminstrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order denying petitioner's request for permanent partial
disability benefits on the grounds that the industrial accident
did not create additional permanent partial disability.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner requests this Honorable Court to review,
reverse and/or remand the Order of the Industrial Commission
Utah for

the purpose of awarding permanent partial disability
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and its insurance carrier to the

1-eJth, a:1d for the further purpose of

lnjur'! Fund benefits and other benefits as the

h<>·;,? accruc,d before the date of death.

~:i;

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner H. Jack Moyes was a sixty-year-old
self-taught accountant c,mployed by the Utah State Department of
Finance.

1

Mr. Moyes experienced the following series of

industrial injuries to his lower back over a period of 12 years
precedin3 the date, of his industrial injury.
(a)

In 1967, Mr. Moyes injured his lower back

during the course of his employment with Ibeck Motor Truck
»;hi le changing a tire

(R.2).

Nine days following this reported

Jccident (R.26), Mr. Moy9s was hospitalized for six days,
3uring which

ti~e

he responded well and rapidly to treatment

IR. 16 3) •

(b)

In 1973, while in the employment of the Utah

State Department of Finance, Mr. Moyes again injured his lower
bac~

when he slipped on som'2 water while walking out of a

restroom at his employer's office (R.24, 62).

The petitioner

was admitted to the hospital approximately one week following
•he industrial injury and was discharged nine days later with

the aooeal of this matter, Mr. Moyes died of causes
t) the industrial injury, on or about October 1,
lSd3. Shirley Moyes, the wife of the decedent, was substituted
~~~ pur?ose of this appeal.
'''n~

"·te'..1~ed

-2-

In 1976, also durin3 the course Jt his

(c)

)

~

F

l

"-1 r •

n d n c •; ,

once more injured his lower back frum liftirq 1

d•'~K

.,, , , ,

(R.LJ~ 1 •

For this injury, Mr. Moyes was pa1 l temporary total
compensation for one week and five days in June 1979, two years
after the date of the alleged injury
(d)

(R.13l(a)).

Finally, on November 5, 1979, due ing the

cours~

of his employment with the Utah State Department of Finance,
Mr. Moyes suffered an injury to his lower back when he fell
down some steps at the State Capitol Building
injury is the subject of Mr. Moyes'
this appeal.
back pain

(R.15, 16).

This

industrial application and

Mr. Moyes missed occasional days at work due to

(R.16, 17), the pain progressed, and on December 8,

1979, Mr. Moyes'

orthopedic surgeon recommended hospitalization

and possible surgery (R.17).

On January 7, 1979, a myelogram

procedure revealed a large herniated disk in the lower back
(R.19).

Surgery was performed the following day to remove the

herniated disk material

(R.19)

required in December 1980

and a second surgery was

(R.20).

Persistent pain and

debilitation necessitated multiple injections and denervation
procedures

(R.20-21), and Mr. Moyes continued to experience

severe back pain and radiating pain and had been unable to work
since he was hospitalized in January 1980

(R.31).

The State Insurance Fund paid temporary total
disability compensation to Mr. Moyes for
1980 to September 24, 1981,

~nd

the period January

also paid medical bills

associated with the surgeries per for'Tled

-3-

( R. 22).

~allowing

'>

03~~

0

nts

?~titioned

a

t

termination of the temporary total
for the November 5, 1979 industrial injury,
the Industrial Commission of Utah for a

'J to delermine the amount of permanent partial disability

,,~0~1ated

with the industrial injury.

The State Insurance

fdncl responded to this petition by denying liability for

:ontinced compensation on the basis that the Moyes application
inadvertently stated that the date of injury was May 5, 1979
instead of the actual date of November 5, 1979 (R.4).

As Mr.

Moyes did not sustain an injury on May 5, 1979, the Fund had no
record of such injury date and accordingly denied liability.
This clerical error was corrected on the record at the initial
hearing for compensation (R.11).

The State Fund further

replied that Mr. Moyes had incurred prior back injuries and
responded that any permanent disability related directly to the
non-industrial injury of 1965 (R.5-6).

At the hearing, Mr.

Moyes established his prior history of industrially-related
~ack

injuries as well as the medical and surgical procedures

necessitated as a result of these injuries (R.8-42).

It was

clarified that although Mr. Moyes was involved in a 1965
non-industrial accident, that accident injured his neck, not
1i.s lower back

(R. 27).

Subsequent to the hearing, the Adrninstrative Law
i,1~e

referred Mr. Moyes to a medical panel for evaluation and

::'co:ne>r.t of his medical condition

(R.44).

Dr. Frank Dituri,

soeci1list i:-i internal medicine (R.57), and Dr. Edward C.
:o~~cer,

1:-i orthopedic surgeon, were appointed to the panel.

-4-

The panel was directed to respon,j tu s9,ocific ·'JU'e'>ti
propounded by the Administrat i11,e L,e·•
"reasonable medical probability"

J:

;n_;

1 l'' tn t"r'"'' -if

(R.J~,

medical panel concluded:
(a)

That the percentage of permanent physical

impairment attributable to Mr. Moyes'

"previously-existing

conditions" is 76% of the whole man (R.117);
(b)

That the percentage of permanent physical

impairment attributable to the industrial accident of November
5, 1979 is 0%; and
(c)

That the permanent physical impairment

attributable to the lumbar spine is the result of long years of
chronic degenerative disease (R.116).
The medical panel neither stated nor explained its
findings in terms of "reasonable medical probability".

The

panel did conclude "there is no medically-demonstrable causal
connection" between Mr. Moyes' medical problems and the
industrial accident of November 5, 1979 (R.117).

This was

supported by a statement that the medical panel "[did] not feel
that the injury in November 1979 for which he did not see a
doctor and for which he did not take off work caused any
serious increase in impairment"

(R.116).

Following receipt of the medical panel report,
objections to the report were timely filed and a hearing was
held.

Dr. Frank Dituri served as the only witness for the

medical panel who presented the medical panel report into
evidence subject to cross-examination (<1..63) . .l\t the hearing

-5-

·ct i·'n; c) ,cr·d ical ;:;anel report, the medical issues were
!

li~.~3~.~~

',~~~

,1~1~

01c<

6~~~~en

Dr. Dituri's conclusions that

~r.

problems were the result of "long years of

ie3~nec3ti~e

disease

1
',

rather than caused by acute

t·1uma related to the industrial accident of November 5, 1979
:?..77-79i.

Dr. Dituri based his finding on a hospital

admitting history (R. 75) and on a March 12, 1980 letter by one
~f

~r.

Moyes' physicians that stated Mr. Moyes experienced a

"steady progression of events" probably not precipitated by the
November industrial injury (R.75).
finai~gs

Dr. Dituri did not base his

on medical evidence, to-wit, test reports, X-rays or

operative and pathological reports

(R. 76-77).

Dr. Dituri

fJr':her admitted that the letter of March 12, 1980, upon which
he relied, was later clarified within nine days by letter of
21, 1980 from the same physician which noted that the

~arcn

~ovember

industrial injury could have precipitated Mr. Moyes'

condition (R.138).
Dr. Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon who
specializes in spine injuries and who became Mr. Moyes'
treating physician, offered significant medical testimony
directly contradicting Dr. Dituri's conclusion that the lower
~ac•

injuries were related to degenerative disease as opposed

to trauma.

Specifically, Dr. Morrow stated:
(a,

-

,. 0

-

f '. 1 ~.

There is a medically demonstrable causal

c e ': ·~ ~ ce n '\ r . Moyes ' 1 owe r back in j u r i es and the

,.J,L;trial accident of November 1979 (R.97);
[bl

Mr. Moyes has residual problems relating to

-6·-

that industrial injury (R.97);
(c)

Mr.

result o f the ind us tr i "l
(d)

Mr.

·,..;1s

~oy·~.s

i

Moy~s

r_··:i~·

11 J '11
~35

) [

Jt

1·1r1
i~·-'

l~a;~

.1

~~

p 0 r~Jn~·1t

r1rt13

1

impairment attributable to the ind 1.;tr ial inJury of November
1979

(R.98);

and

(e)

Future medical treatment will be

r~quired

as a

result of the November 1979 industrial injury (R.98-99).
Dr. Morrow's conclusions were based upon competent
medical evidence, including the results of a myelogram
procedure performed on Mr. Moyes on January 7, 1980 which
demonstrated "findings consistent with a left antero-lateral
herniated nucleus palposus at L-4/L-5 level"

(R. 99).

The

operative report of Mr. Moyes' physician was also relied upon
by Dr. Morrow which noted a "moderately large bulging disk"
{R.99).

Dr. Morrow testified that it was reasonably medically

probable that the large herniation was caused by the November
1979 industrial injury,

notwithstanding pre-existing

degenerative disease, because a large herniation of the type
Mr. Moyes had would "probably not have been going on for a long
period of time"
trauma.

(R.104),

and would not have been caused without

At the conclusion of Dr. Morrow's testimony, Dr.

Dituri was again called to the stand and asked if, in his
opinion, the industrial accident of November 1979 could
reasonably have caused the injury as related by Dr.

~orrow.

The Administrative Law Judge would not allow a response.
Subsequent to the he3ring on obJections to medical

-7-

,,,

''''°>ct, :::v• Administrati'le Law Judge made Fin:ling 3 o:

1c

:Jmpensation for the reason that the industrial

'i1 ~0:: cause any permanent partial disability.
,11n1,

In so

the Administrtive Law Judge made no findings or

:Aplanarion of the medical issues raised, but simply concluded,
w1tno1t explanation, that the petition should be denied
A timely filed motion for review before the

R. 18 7) •
Ind,~strial

Commission was denied (R.203), resulting in this

ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER SHIRLEY MOYES MAY PROSECUTE
THIS APPEAL FOR BENEFITS WHICH WOULD
HAVE ACCRUED PRIOR TO DATE OF DEATH.

A side issue raised since the motion to substitute
parties was granted by this Honorable Court questions
?etitioner's right to appeal benefits after the date of death
Jf

H. Jack Moyes.

A majority of courts have found claims not

to be abated where the applicant dies during the hearing
This is so even during appeal where the claim was

?rocess.

originally denied.

Lightle v. Department of Labor, 413 P.2d

314 (Wash. 1966); Powell v. Deeartment of Labor, 485 P.2d 990
'"'lash. 1971),

~.

463 P.2d 748

(Wash. App. 1970).

This claim is necessarily limited to the amount
-·1:h would ha?e accrued prior to petitioner's date of death
;n,bs>:r ial .:o,nmission not denied the claim.
_.~:trt'll
'.

-;,::·J.:>_:;.;i-:

i..1

See Parker

,:J:nn1;sion, 37 Utah 468, 50 P.2d 278 (Utah 1935),
?acific States :2ast Iron Pine Co. v.

-8-

Industrial

Commission, 218 P.2d 970

(Utah 1950).

the sole issue is causaticin of SI

In the

.-Jt.31':,;.iir'.'·

not associated with the industrial

iniury?

of an award are known and subm1ttPd.

instan~

'ti,3s

it

All other

~~tter,
cir·~,.,,

fac~o:

Thus, under these limite·.'

conditions, the widow or estate should be allowed to continue
to prosecute this appeal and receive payment accrued prior to
the injured employee's date of death.
Workmen's Compensation Law, §58.42,
II.

See, generally, Larson,

et~··

Vol. 2 (1982).

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARBITRARILY
DISREGARDED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
PETITIONER'S FAVOR, AND ENTERED FINDINGS
OF FACT UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Although the Industrial Commission's findings and
conclusions on questions of fact are not ordinarily subject to
review, an important exception is made where "the findings of
fact do not support the award".
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 889

Kaiser Steel Corp. v.

(1981)

(construing Utah Code Ann.

§31-1-84 (2)).
The Administrative Law Judge, without explanation,
simply disregarded substantial and material evidence presented
in petitioner's favor at the hearing on objections to the
medical panel report.

Despite his acknowledgment that

petitioner's treating physician, Dr. Morrow, was a "very fine
orthopedic specialist", the Administrative Law Judge ignored
the treating surgeon's testimony about petitioner's impairment
and its probable cause.
The Administrative Law Judge's refusal to believe
Dr. Morrow is manifestly unreasonable because his testimony is

-9-

,~1

0n

J~contradicted,
·~;r1c,

<<
J _- ! '::

r"

tr

a 'J :-:iu

3
4

competent medical evidence, including

and an operative report noting "a large

hernia of the type usually associated with

The refusal to give due weight to this

=co•tanti3l medical evidence is especially unjust to petitioner
since Dr. Dituri admitted the medical panel report was not
b3sed upon

co~parable

medical evidence.

The "Commission cannot

act arbitrarily and simply ignore competent and credible
evidence when there is nothing discrediting therein and there
is no evidence so contrary". Buxton v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 587 P.2d 121, 123 (1978).

See Vause v. Industrial

Commission of Utah, 17 Utah 2d 217, 407 P.2d 1006 (1965).
Credible and important medical evidence in
petitioner's favor was presented without substantial
contradiction at the hearing on objections to the medical panel
report.

The fact such evidence was totally ignored justifies

the conclusion that the Commission acted capriciously,
arbitrarily and unreasonably in disregarding or refusing to
believe the evidence.

Therefore, the Industrial Commission's

denial of benefits is not supported by the evidence and must be
rev"=rsed.

III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE COMPELS A FINDING
IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER AS THE ONLY
REASONABLE FINDING THAT COULD BE MADE,
AND THE co~~ISSION'S REFUSAL TO DO so
IS CAPRICIOUS AND ARBITRARY.
The clear standard for when the Industrial
c1.:ntssi.')n's Findings of Fact shC>uld be displaced is when:

-10-

[T]he Commission's findinJ.c· J:·e "1:t•1tro:.

capricious", or nwhol1·1· 'wi
contrary

t,-:1

the

".);ie

[ ir1e·; i ..

,,~t

'J.'J.;?"

1:--,1~~

from the evidence" or 'Nit'.1·1ut "anj'

evidence" to support
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Manfredi,

._>)n--

i -

<--1-1':.tJl

s 1 J~

th~m.

~'

1t S90.

v. Coca-Cola Bottling Comoany of Ogden, 656 P.2d
(1982).

·H

H
1

See Kincheloe
~40,

443

The only evidence upon which the Commission relied in

denying petitioner permanent partial benefits was the
subjective conclusion of the medical panel that because
applicant suffered from significant pre-existing injury which
was in the nature of degenerative disk disease, there was no
causal connection between the industrial accident of November
5, 1978 and the subsequent surgery and disability.
It is the Industrial Commission, rather than the
medical panel, which has the responsibility of deciding the
issues in each case.
442

(1967).

Jensen v. U.S. Fuel Co., 424 P.2d 440,

In deciding issues in workmen's compensation

proceedings, the Commission's duty is to consider not just the
medical panel's report, "but also all of the other evidence an0
to draw whatever inferences and deductions that fairly and
reasonably could be derived therefrom".

IGA Food Fair v.

Martin, 5 8 4 P • 2 d 8 2 8 , 8 3 0 ( 19 7 8 ) .
There is no indication in this case that

th~

Industrial Commission considered all or even any of the
substantial and largely uncontested evidence in petitioner's
favor.

Instead, it simply adopted the medical panel's

conclusion.

As stated, the medical panel relied heavily upon

-11-

1~~it~1ng

~istory

:11n

as

w~ll

as a letter from an

which, on its face,

~as

speculative, not

cross-examination and later modified.
cl"

,~,i:

'=.io

If these were

significant items relied upon by the medical

pan~l,

it is then obvious that the medical panel was attempting

not to

e~aluate

and diagnose, but rather to replace its own

subJective opinion for the determination of the Administrative
L3w Judge.
When faced with demonstrable medical evidence,
to-wit, the myelogram report and pathology, the chairman of the
medical panel admitted that he did not look at, nor did he
consider, this piece of evidence at all.

When confronted with

this direct evidence, the chairman of the medical panel was not
allowed to state his opinion as to whether there was a
reasonable medical probability that the industrial injury in
fact caused the subsequent disability.

(R.94.)

Thus, the

record reveals that there is no substantial evidence to support
the conclusion or decision of the Commission.

On the other

hand, as discussed above, the evidence clearly and persuasively
supports petitioner's claim.
In a similar case, Powers v. Industrial Commission,
~ l

Ll'Ah

a~opt~1,

2d

2-~0,

427 P.2d 740

without question, the
st3~1~g

~,

\<dC,C

(1967), the Industrial Commission

CJ3j

~edical

panel report and denied

that the firefighting activities of the

not aggravated

3

pre-existing '.leart disease.

This

our• reversed tne decision, first noting that the medical
~~c0'.

report was erroneously based in large part on the fact

-12-

that the claimant did not consc1lt a Joct'H ''ntii s:·<
after the incident.

Secondly, thAJ stated th3t the

may not disregard substantiallj uncontra·Jertecl e"i J'"n:o
supporting a claim that an industrial accident aggravatod a
pre-existing ailment.

See also, Perchelli v. Utah State

Industrial Commission, 25 Utah 2d 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970)
(conclusion unsupported by record).
As in the Powers case, in the present case the
medical panel report and Administrative Law Judge's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law rely heavily on the fact that
petitioner did not immediately report to his doctor, but waited
over a month until the time of his next appointment.
Additionally, the Commission adopts the medical panel report
which unreasonably and arbitrarily ignores credible competent
evidence which clearly and persuasively supports petitioner's
claim.

Thus, actions of the Commission in adopting without

question the conclusory medical report, despite substantial
evidence compelling a finding in favor of petitioner, are
arbitrary and capricious.
As this Court has asserted, the right to review
decisions of the Industrial Commission was not intended to
provide an "automatic rubber stamp" for Commission actions,
"rather, it was intended as a safeguard against possible
arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust actions of the Commission".
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction
1146

(1977).

&

Mining Coro., 565 P.2d 11-H,

Utah statutes provide:
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The

c·J~~i33io~,

upon referral of a case to it
judge, or upon a

3~ ~~~1nistrative law
~,,t; in cc~icq file·:l with
.·;

c

J-~r, 1jr 3.0
ipo~Qrnen~3l

·

.tan

.~·.Jd~

0

c.~r

it to review its own

administrative law judge's

order, shall review the entire
:l rn2de in said case.
(Emphasis added.)

An'1. §35-1-82.54 (Supp. 1983).
In this case, the only conclusion which can be

reasonably drawn from the evidence of the "entire record" is
that petitioner's industrial accident created additional
permanent partial disability.
~ommission's

Therefore, the Industrial

refusal to so find is contrary to law and reason

and must be reversed.
IV.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ACTED
ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY
FAILING TO ADOPT FINDINGS OF FACT.

There is no controversy in this case that an
accident occurred or that the applicant was entitled to
temporary total disability benefits and medical payments.

The

sole issue to be determined by the Industrial Commission was:
:lid the petitioner suffer an impairment or aggravation to
?re-existin~

accident?

impairments as a result of the industrial

This is a factual issue which must be determined

Mased upon proper findings of fact.
l•dq'

stated in his decision only that after reviewing the

t~3timnn1

\:11ii11i ..

of Dr. Morrow and the medical panel report, the

tr:iti·::> La·"
'lo

'.~,re'110

The Administrative Law

f~rth~r

J·Jd~e

adopts the findings of the medical

expl3~ation

was given.

i:=.l·/ he:j:
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As this Court has

Without proper subordinate finclings, it is
impossible for a reviewing Ct)urt to ~x~rcis0
its duty of determinin1 whether the ~~m~1ssi0n
applied a[)prO!=Jria•_e leqal stJnd1r.Jc, to r1n,c1n,1;
adequately supported by the e'Jidenccc.
Barney
1980).

&

Sons v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 9-13, 949

(Utah

The medical report states:
We do not feel that the injury of November of
1979, for which he did not see a doctor and for
which he did not take off work, caused a
serious increase in this impairment.
(R.186.)
(Emphasis added.)

Thus, the report erroneously relies in great part on the fact
that petitioner did not immediately consult his doctor.

As

discussed above, whether or not the petitioner immediately
seeks medical attention is not determinative of a claim for
compensation for aggravation of pre-existing impairments.
Powers v. Industrial Commission, supra, at 742.

By simply

adopting the report of the medical panel which is not competent
evidence and which admittedly relied upon assumptions rather
than demontrable medical evidence, the Commission compounded
not only its "gratuitous assumptions, but also the unfounded
conclusions that sprang therefrom".
v. Industrial Commission,

Redman Warehousing Corp.

22 Utah 2d 398,

454 P.2d 283, 285

( 1969) •
Additionally,

it must be noted that the head of the

medical panel and the only member to testify in support of its
"findings of fact" at the hearing on objections is a specialist
in internal medicine.

Utah workmen's compensation statutes

specify that a medical panel with qualifications set forth in
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;.

,:>.rl'•·

,J,o
1

~~)fC_,,-=:t: ~

)3';-2-56
-~f

•~iic1l
_2:_~~ L d

1z

inu'l~e3

the

(Supp. 1982) should evaluate the
cas~.

"The Commission shall appoint an

panel to consist of one or more physicians

ing in the treatment of a disease or condition
in the claim." (Emphasis added.)
Although Dr. Spencer, one member of the medical

p~nel,

is 3n orthopedic surgeon, it is clear that Dr. Dituri

played a major role in establishing the panel's finding that
the industrial accident did not create additional partial
disability.

Dr. Dituri's testimony makes it clear that he has

no expertise or even understanding of back injuries and
problems relating thereto.

Thus, it is in direct conflict with

petitioner's statutory right that the evaluation by an expert
in the field if his injury to have a non-expert play such a
~ajar

role which results in denial of significant benefits.
Petitioner does not argue that the Commission is

duty bound to accept the testimony of petitioner's witness
above that of the medical panel witnesses.

The Commission

cannot, however, arbitrarily accept one conclusion over another
without a finding as to the reasons for adopting one version
o~er

3nother, especially where the version accepted is not
by competent medical evidence.

s~poorted

i~po3sible

In such case, it is

to determine whether the Commission applied

3poropriate legal standards.
T2 merely "accept" or "adopt" the panel's finding as
',

~

'"'",

~he

'1~tf111der

Industrial Commission elevates the panel to

and thus encroaches upon its own authority to make
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findings of fact.

TCie> prc1p.:·c '.' :r;

limited to medical P;<ainin.1ti-,1 :ini

J;.,

l

·,

Lo]'l•J_;:o,

be considered by the C')m:n1s.;inn in arr1v1ng ac
decision •

Jensen v . Uni t e d S tat es Fu e 1 ,

~~,

l~
ci.~.

'° t

~lt::n.1'•:

4 4 1.

CONCLUSION
The major factual history presented demonstrates an
admitted industrial accident followed by two major surgeries;
payment of significant temporary total disability for
approximately 20 months; payment of substantial medical
benefits; significant objective medical findings in the form of
myelograms and X-rays, as well as actual observable evidence
demonstrating a traumatic herniation of disk material, not a
degenerative process.

In addition, a medical specialist

testified, based upon demonstrable medical evidence and to a
medical certainty, that a permanent partial aggravation
occurred.
Against these uncontroverted facts, the Commission
arbitrarily adopted the unsupported opinion of the medical
panel, which admittedly did not consider all of the evidence
and was not allowed to change or clarify its opinion at the
conclusion of the panel hearing.
It is accordingly respectfully submitted that the
Industrial Commission of Utah erred in adopting the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law adopted by the Administrative
Judge.

La~

The Commission's Order denying benefits should be

reversed and remanded for the purpose of awarding payment of
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i;cscHrment benefits to the applicant, H. Jack

~.J:"'i'ling

·,.;ijow and/or estate.

RESPECTFULLY SU3'1ITTED this

,!_st!

day of February,

GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
Telephone:
533-8383

Attorneys for Petitioner
0359L
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